In December 1999, the minimum legal age for purchasing alcohol in New Zealand was reduced from 20 to 18 years. Using hospitalization and mortality data from 1988 to 2006 we evaluate the effect of relaxing restrictions on alcohol access in this context. Using a difference in differences methodology, our study shows a substantial jump in alcohol-related hospitalizations among those newly eligible to legally purchase liquor. We find that the increase was larger for males (around 26%) than females (around 16%), and that those younger than 18 did not experience an increase in alcohol-related hospitalizations. Although we find a substantial increase in alcohol-related morbidity, we consider that prior work overstated the increase. Based on hospitalizations, we find little evidence for alcohol substituting drugs, and we report suggestive evidence for the view that after becoming legally eligible young people gradually learn to drink responsibly. We consider regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of lowering the minimum legal purchase age and find that they are not closely related to differencein-difference estimates, perhaps reflecting imperfect enforcement for those close to the cutoff age.
Introduction
Although many adults enjoy consuming alcoholic beverages, it is an ongoing social challenge to determine how and when to introduce youths to alcohol. The main instrument of public policy in this regard is the minimum purchase age (MPA), below which a person may not purchase liquor.
In New Zealand, the minimum purchase age came down from 21 to 20 in 1967, then from 20 to 18 in 1999. In 2010, and in response to concerns about alcohol-related harm, the New Zealand government proposed legislation that would partially reverse the 1999 changes.
In the United States there was a similar reduction in minimum purchase ages in the 1960s and 1970s which was subsequently reversed in the 1980s. The Amethyst Initiative has sought to renew debate in the U.S.A. about this policy tool. There have been several important studies that evaluate the impact of changes in the minimum purchase age in the United States (for example, Dee (1999) and Dee and Evans (2001) , and the review in Wagenaar and Toomey (2002) ). Social changes, especially in attitudes toward driving while intoxicated, since the early 1980s cast doubt on the contemporary relevance of some of the research results from this earlier time.
In this context, we quantify some of the health costs of a lower minimum purchase age. Easier access to alcohol is likely to increase consumption, including excess consumption, and therefore increase the incidence of alcohol-related morbidity. We examine New Zealand data on hospitalizations and mortality over the period in which the minimum legal age for purchasing alcohol was reduced from twenty years to eighteen. We use those over twenty as our primary comparison group arguing that the lower purchase age should not have had much impact on this group and any changes we see in it can proxy for broader social influences that affect eighteen and nineteen year olds too.
More specifically, our study examines the following questions. First, what was the effect of reducing the minimum purchase age on morbidity and mortality of 18 and 19 year-olds? This is the group that became legally entitled to purchase liquor. Second, how were those under the age of 18 affected? Law enforcement is always imperfect, and it is important to consider the consequences for those ostensibly not affected by the law. Third, are negative health consequences for young people due to youth or their inexperience? If it is inexperience, then the argument for a higher minimum purchase age is more limited. Fourth, did changes in the liquor laws affect drug-related health problems as argued in what we call the substitution hypothesis (DiNardo and Lemieux, 2001 ).
From a traditional economic perspective, external costs and benefits are most important for public policy. How much alcohol-related morbidity represents external costs rather than internal costs? A hangover may be viewed as an internal cost, since it is primarily borne by the drinker.
By contrast, injuries inflicted by an intoxicated aggressor might properly be thought of as external
costs. It is not immediately obvious what fraction of health consequences are external and internal.
Perhaps further research can analyze this more carefully. It is difficult to tell which incidents in our data reflect self-inflicted harm and which reflect harm to an innocent bystander, for example. 1 It seems likely that alcohol-related hospitalizations reflect mostly the consequences of the patient's own consumption. Our results understate some external costs associated with alcohol, such as injuries to third parties in automobile accidents. This paper gives some historical background about alcohol consumption and legislation in New Zealand as well as a review of the literature on the effects of minimum purchase age laws in section 2. Section 3 discusses our data. Section 4 gives an overview of our empirical approach and our results.
1 A behavioral economics perspective might go further and suggest that some self-inflicted harm (e.g., hangovers) represent a sort of external cost. The literature on self-control and present bias in preferences argues that in some circumstances people need to be protected from themselves. This may be particularly true of youths, who frequently engage in a diverse array of risky behaviors (see Gruber, 2001 , for more on risky behavior by youth in the United States). Paternalistic impulses suggest that public policy should be concerned with some internal costs too.
Related Literature

Historical Background
New Zealand in the 19th century was very young, very male, very transient, and very drunk. The dominant influence on New Zealand population in the 19th century was the immigration of young Britons, often single men. These men were frequently employed in crews of whalers, sealers, miners, or various other occupations in which transience was typical. Excessive drinking and associated public disorder and crime were seen as significant social problems of the day.
Between 1880 and 1920, New Zealand's parliament passed around 50 laws restricting the consumption of alcohol. A strong temperance movement developed, allied with the movement for women's suffrage, and though a majority regularly supported legal prohibition in referenda, the proposition required a 60% super-majority to pass. (See Belich, 2001.) In 1910, the legal drinking age was raised from 18 to 21. In 1917, liquor sales after six o'clock p.m. were prohibited. (This gave rise to the so-called 'six o'clock swill' in which men would rush from their workplace to the pub to purchase and consume a large amount of liquor, and then drive home.) Six o'clock closing remained the law until 1967, when liquor sales could occur until 10 p.m. Soon after, in 1969, the minimum purchase age was lowered from 21 to 20. Continuing this liberalization, many restrictions on liquor licensing were eased on 1989.
In 1999, the Sale of Liquor Amendment Act lowered the minimum purchase age in New Zealand from 20 to 18. There were many other changes introduced with the law, but the lower MPA was probably the most prominent. 2 Among the main arguments presented were that 18 year olds were deemed old enough to vote, old enough to serve in the military, and marry, so should surely be old enough to purchase alcohol. Similar arguments were deployed in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s (see Cook, 2007) .
2 Other changes included allowing Sunday sales, and legal sale of beer in supermarkets.
Since the Sale of Liquor Amendment Act of 1999, debate has continued about the merits of a lower MPA. Much anecdotal evidence suggests an increase in teenage drinking, especially among those younger than 18. The associated harms of public intoxication, unwanted sexual encounters, alcohol-induced violence, and more, have promoted interest in returning the minimum purchase age to 20. In 2010, the New Zealand Law Commission, a body of lawyers that advises the government on legislation, produced an extensive report (New Zealand Law Commission (2010) ) proposing a wide range of reforms to laws governing liquor sales, consumption, etc., that endorsed a minimum purchase age of 20.
In the United States, the Amethyst Initiative supports renewed debate regarding the legal drinking age. Since there have been many changes in social patterns of drinking (and drunk driving) in the United States since the early 1980s when the 21 year old limit was established, some observers doubt the relevance of evidence from that time regarding the effects of changes in the drinking age. We hope this study will be informative both for the New Zealand debate and for the United States.
Minimum Purchase Age vs Minimum Drinking Age
New Zealand's laws about alcohol access for young people are framed primarily in terms of the minimum legal age for purchasing alcohol. (We abbreviate minimum legal purchase age as MLPA or MPA.) This age has changed over time, most recently in 1999. There is no general proscription against those below the minimum legal purchase age consuming alcohol. There are specific proscriptions, for example against those under 18 consuming alcohol in a public bar, unless a parent or guardian is present.
In the United States, each state is free to regulate the production and sale of alcohol within its own borders under the 21st Amendment to the U.S. constitution. Under threat of partial withdrawal of federal funding for highway construction, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have laws that restrict the sale and public possession of alcohol to those 21 years old and over.
Though this is due to a law called the National Minimum Drinking Age Act (1984) , the law does not required states to ban consumption by those younger than 21, and only fourteen states actually do so.
The United States does not have uniform national laws regarding youth access to alcohol. And despite the impression that there is a minimum drinking age, this is only so in a portion of the country. The laws in the United States and New Zealand are closer in practice than they may appear at first glance.
Effects of Minimum Purchase Age
In the United States context, the general reductions and subsequent increases in the minimum legal purchase age were staggered across states. This staggering facilitates a difference-in-differences empirical approach to investigating the effects of raising or lowering the drinking age. When one state raises its minimum drinking age, other states that do not increase their minimum drinking age at the same time are used as controls to estimate the effect of the policy. Wagenaar and Toomey (2002) survey studies of the effects of the minimum drinking age on the behavior of young people in the United States and Canada. The research is mostly based on data from the 1970s and 1980s. The studies generally find that a higher drinking age tends to reduce alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harms.
These findings are confirmed in Dee (1999) , who emphasizes the importance of state level heterogeneity (using fixed effects in panel data models). He shows that a higher minimum purchase age lowers reported drinking and binge drinking, but that inferences about the effect of beer excise taxes are not robust to allowing for state-level fixed effects. 3 Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) use the minimum purchasing age laws to estimate the effect of alcohol consumption on mortality. Instead of relying on a change in the legal purchase age, they use the discontinuity in eligibility to purchase alcohol when a person turns 21. Using American data, they show that those legally eligible to purchase alcohol have a higher propensity to consume as well as higher rates of mortality and morbidity, which they attribute to the effect of alcohol consumption.
In our data we have the exact date of birth of those admitted to hospital or who die. This is an important feature of Carpenter and Dobkin's paper that permits them to use the regression discontinuity approach. Since New Zealand is so much more sparsely populated, we have fewer observations, and so less power to estimate an effect of alcohol availability on health outcomes. In our favor, we have data for a period during which the age of eligibility changes. In principle this allows us to test whether it is the legal eligibility to purchase alcohol or merely having a certain birthday that influences a person's behavior.
One of the major reasons why the United States drinking age became established at 21 in the early 1980s is the high rate of mortality among youths in automobile accidents involving alcohol. Cook (2007) reports " [f] or the sixteen-to-twenty age group, the number of alcohol-related traffic fatalities nationwide declined by over half between the mid-1980s and 2002" (p. 188.) Given that drunk driving appears to be less prevalent now than in the past, maybe having a lower drinking age would not be as problematic as it was in the 1970s. Examining the New Zealand data may give some insight on this question. (There has been a substantial reduction in the number of automobile fatalities among young people in New Zealand in the last 25 years. Since alcohol is a major factor in many of these crashes, presumably drunk driving is becoming less problematic in this age group.)
The Sale of Liquor Act 1999 and its Consequences
Several papers study the effects of the Sale of Liquor Act (SoLA) on health and behavioral outcomes of young people. Wilkins et al. (2002) (2010)). Many of the components of the plan attempt to restrict supply relative to the status quo. Included in the proposal is a split purchase age where those 18 years old and above could purchase liquor in bars, while retail outlets could only sell to those 20 years and above. As the legislation progresses through the parliament, it is likely that the possibility of an across-the-board purchase age of 20 will be considered too (Armstrong, 2010 ).
Amethyst Initiative
The Amethyst Initiative is an attempt by leaders of U.S. higher education institutions, starting in 2008, to generate debate over the appropriate public policy surrounding youth drinking. The
Initiative issued a statement, signed by over 100 college and university presidents as of August 2010, asserting that "a culture of dangerous, clandestine "binge-drinking"-often conducted off-campushas developed." Several other undesirable features of current law are also cited. Though the Initiative does not officially support any particular alternative, it clearly is not in favor of more stringent restrictions, and the illegality of those under 21 drinking is contrasted with the legal ability to vote, contract, serve on a jury, and serve in the military. These activities generally become legal when a person turns 18.
The Amethyst Initiative does not cite any research that supports its assertions. The basis for the statement is "our experience as college and university presidents." By contrast, using data from the annual survey Monitoring the Future, Cook (2007) states that binge drinking by college-age youths peaked in 1981, declined during the subsequent decade, and has remained stable since then (p. 193). Dee and Evans (2001) present findings that a higher minimum legal purchase age in the 1980s decreased alcohol-related problems among eighteen to twenty year olds, but that it might have increased later harm. The tradeoff of alcohol-related problems among teens for alcohol-related problems for twenty-somethings accords with some of the Amethyst Initiative's arguments about learning.
By contrast, our data do not indicate a significant drop in alcohol-related morbidity within several years of becoming legally eligible to purchase liquor. We discuss this finding further in section 4.5.
Data
We use data from the New Zealand Health Information Service. Our dataset covers all deaths and all hospitalizations in public hospitals for people up to 30 years old between 1988 and 2006.
(Almost all hospitalizations were in public hospitals during this period.) Figure 1 shows that morbidity incidents were trending up while mortality incidents were trending down for this age group over this period of time.
Our data includes a large amount of information about medical diagnoses (including International Classification of Disease (ICD) codes) and symptoms, as well as some personal information regarding individual characteristics. This information includes the person's date of birth as well as the date of the incident. We combine these data with cohort population estimates from Statistics New Zealand. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1 Figure 2 shows the trend over time in alcohol-and drug-related morbidity for males and females. Contrary to the trends in mortality, morbidity in these cases has risen substantially over time. The graphs show similar rates and increases in drug-related hospitalizations for men and women. However, alcohol-related hospitalizations are substantially higher for men.
There was a change in the way emergency department cases were reported in 2000. Previously only cases that resulted in a hospital admission would be recorded, while from 2000 emergency room presentations that did not result in hospitalization were also recorded. This may have generated part of the upward trend in morbidity, but there appears to have been a pre-existing upward trend, which continued well after 2000, at least to some degree.
The substitution hypothesis argues that looser alcohol control policies will induce young people to substitute away from drug consumption toward alcohol consumption. We argue in section 4.2 that the New Zealand data do not support this hypothesis, though our test is based on morbidity and not consumption directly. Figure 3 shows the age profile of morbidity incidents and provides some evidence on the importance of learning or experience in mitigating alcohol-related health problems. In particular, after age twenty there is a decline in alcohol-related morbidity as age increases, even as drug-related morbidity remains high and stable. This figure also documents the steep increase in morbidity among teenagers. From the perspective of econometric identification, it is important to note that this graph does not allow us to separate an experience effect from and age effect (which would be unchanged by legislation). We discuss later possible strategies to separate out an experience effect from an age effect.
The mortality data provides information on the date of the incident, the exact date of birth of the deceased, the person's sex, the person's ethnicity (with many missing), and a geographic variable that gives the region of birth. We have a variable the indicates whether alcohol was involved with the death, but this only has substantial coverage for incidents after 1999. Figure 1 shows the trend in mortality over time. There has been a major reduction in youth mortality over this period in New Zealand. The number of deaths has fallen by about 50% among both males and females. Relative to this downward trend, there does not appear to be a significant increase in mortality among young people around the time of the law change whose effect we are estimating. Figure 4 shows a large increase in deaths with alcohol involved in 2000. As noted above, this is likely related to changes in reporting practices rather than underlying events. As evidence for this view, note that the large apparent increases in alcohol-related deaths do not show up in the overall mortality numbers. males represents a death rate of around 0.16%. While the death rates of 11 year olds are similar for males and females, only about 300 females die at age 20 in our dataset, so the increase in mortality during adolescence is much smaller for females. Note that the earliest a person can obtain a driver license in New Zealand is on their 15th birthday. 4 We do not have data on alcohol consumption. Our hypothesis is that the change in the minimum purchase age would affect health outcomes through a change in drinking behavior. We do not have data to study this directly. Wilkins et al. (2002) and Habgood et al. (2001) have survey data on the alcohol consumption patterns of young New Zealanders over this time period. There was an increase in consumption of alcoholic beverages during this time and the increase generated a movement toward relatively more consumption of hard liquor.
Empirical Approach
Our primary empirical approach is to estimate difference in differences effects of the Sale of Liquor Act on health outcomes. We do not have a separate geographical area that was not subject to the law change. Instead we use people twenty years and over as a control group. It is possible also to use sixteen and seventeen year olds as part of the control group since there was no change in their legal ability to purchase liquor. However, we mostly exclude those under eighteen from our regressions. Arguing that lowering the purchase age probably altered the availability of alcohol to those younger than eighteen, we can estimate separate effects for this age group in some regressions.
Our difference in differences effects come from estimating equations along the lines of log(y sat ) = β 0 + β 1 t + β 2 a + β 3 P ost1999 t + β 4 18or19 a + β 5 18or19 a * P ost1999 t + sat
( 1) where the unit of observation is a sex (s), age in years (a), year (t) group. P ost1999 t is a dummy equal to one if the year is 2000 or later, and 18or19 a is a dummy equal to one only for eighteen and nineteen year olds. The difference in differences effect is β 5 . We estimate equation 1 separately for males and females. Prior work in New Zealand has not given as much effort to distinguishing effects on men and women.
The outcome variable in our regression equations is (the log of) a count of hospitalizations with an alcohol-related diagnosis code, or in other regressions a drug-related diagnosis code. Given the count nature of the variable, we also estimate Poisson regression models. In a further cut of the data, we define y to be the number of incidents per thousand people in the cohort, using population estimates from Statistics New Zealand. In a final version of our dependent variable we use alcohol-related morbidity as a fraction of total hospitalizations.
Unless otherwise indicated, all our regressions use data from seven years before and seven years after the law change. We use observations for those aged between sixteen and twenty-one years (inclusive). We redefine years so that a year runs from 1 December to 30 November. For example, 2000 in our dataset is 1 December 1999 to 30 November 2000. This means that year zero (the first year after the law change) corresponds exactly with the year 2000.
In equation 1 sixteen and seventeen year olds are implicitly used as a control group. We estimate a separate effect for them by adding a 16or17 a dummy and an interaction of that dummy with the P ost1999 t dummy.
In some specifications we study mortality. We use the same observational units, but since there are occasional zeros report log specifications where the dependent variable is the log of mortality incidents.
We explore the data using regression discountinuity-style estimators also. There is a clear The basic RD effects come from estimating equations like
where now age (a) is measured in days relative to the minimum legal purchase age (M LP A), the date t is measured in days relative to 1 December 1999, and 1 is the indicator function. The RD effect is β 3 . For the RD regressions we use a shorter span of time to take morbidity data from. We also typically augment equation 2 with higher order polynomial functions of a and t, and we report results that come from using only men or only women in estimating the equation. Since the unit of observation is much smaller in this regression we have many zeros in the dependent variable.
Therefore we estimate basic linear models.
One alternative to equation 2 is to restrict the sample to eighteen and nineteen year olds, dropping a and replacing 1(a ≥ M LP A t ) with 1(t ≥ 1Dec1999). This is the Law change-based estimate, purely due to any change in morbidity among 18 and 19 year olds around the date the new law was implemented. A second alternative is to restrict the sample to either before or after 1 December 1999. In either sample drop the time variable from the regression above and note that 1(a ≥ M LP A t ) is a function only of age, not the date, since in either sample the law does not change. The RD estimate is based on the contrast in morbidity between those just above the MLPA and those just below. (In the early sample the contrast is 19 year olds and 20 year olds. In the later sample the contrast is 17 year olds and 18 year olds.) This is the age-based estimate and is most similar to Carpenter and Dobkin's estimation strategy. What the graphs show, apart from an upward trend in alcohol-related diagnoses, is that the trend for those in the 18 and 19 year old age group moved from being at or below the level for 20 and 21 year olds to being generally higher in the period since the Sale of Liquor Act was implemented. This is evidence for an effect of the law on health outcomes for this age group. There is less clear evidence that the health outcomes among 16 and 17 year olds were also adversely affected, suggesting the law did not substantially alter the accessibility of alcohol for that age group relative to those 20 years and over.
Results
Difference in Differences
It is important that the graphs suggest a common, ongoing upward trend in alcohol-related morbidity among the groups. The base difference in differences specification we use allows for a time trend but restricts it to be equal for each group. This assumption appears to be reasonable in our case.
Figures 8 (males) and 9 (females) show mortality series for the same age groups. There is the expected increase in mortality incidents in 2000, but note that for men it occurs in all age groups, not only 18 and 19 year olds, as would be expected if the law change had a large effect on mortality of that group. Instead it appears to be due to the change in reporting. Among females, the jump is larger for 18 and 19 year olds, but there are few cases, and the increase for this age group is not persistent. Tables 6 through 6 show difference-in-difference estimates of the effects of lowering the MPA. Table 6 reports estimates when the dependent variable is the log of hospitalizations for the group. Table 6 reports estimates from the Poisson regression model (incidence rate ratios are reported). Table 6 reports estimates when the dependent variable is the log of incidents per thousand members of the population cohort. Finally, Table 6 reports estimates when the dependent variable is alcoholrelated hospitalizations as a proportion of all hospitalizations for the relevant age-sex-year group.
Each table presents estimates for males and females separately, and shows results from incorporating various year and age controls. In addition, estimates for the sixteen and seventeen year old groups are also shown.
Across these various specifications and estimation procedures, our results are consistent. The
Sale of Liquor Act appears to have caused an increase in alcohol-related hospitalizations, especially for 18 an 19 year old males. We estimate the effect for males at about 26% in the log-linear model.
The effect is similar in the Poisson model since the coefficients reported are incidence rate ratios.
When we account for cohort size variation the estimated effects fall somewhat, down to 21.5% for males, and to around 12% and not statistically significant for females (from 16% in the log linear specification).
We see no strong evidence that hospitalizations among sixteen and seventeen year olds increased due to the law change. In one case (using proportion of all hospitalizations) there appears to have been a reduction in hospitalizations of young males. However, this conclusion does not emerge from any other specification.
Compare our results with those of Everitt and Jones (2002) . They do not estimate separate effects for males and females, and their study is based on the experience of a single emergency department in central Auckland. They find a 50% increase in morbidity among 18 and 19 year olds, and an increase for 15 to 17 year olds too. Our results are more modest, an effect about half as large for males and a third as large for females in the 18 and 19 year old group, with no effect for those younger. It is possible that their results are larger because of the specific location of the hospital they study, whereas we are using what is close to the population of hospitalizations in New Zealand. In addition, they consider a shorter period of time, and some of their results may reflect the increasing trend in alcohol-related health problems that need not be due to the Sale of Liquor Act. Even while highlighting the differences in our findings from Everitt and Jones, we should note the agreement between our studies, that young males directly affected by the law change experienced significant increases in serious health problems.
Substitution of Drugs for Alcohol
Young people may respond to a relaxation of alcohol restrictions by substituting toward alcohol and away from other drugs. DiNardo and Lemieux (2001) argues that the U.S. experience is consis-tent with the substitution hypothesis. They find that during the 1980s, U.S. states that increased the minimum legal drinking age saw decreases in teen alcohol consumption. These decreases were associated with similarly-sized increases in drug consumption. We examine a possible implication of the substitution hypothesis in our data and report results in Table 6 . 5 We estimate regression models like equation 1 but use drug-related hospitalizations instead of alcohol-related hospitalizations as our outcome variable. As before, and unlike DiNardo and Lemieux (2001), we do not have a geographically separate comparison group, but we use outcomes among those over 20 years old as the control group outcome. Table 6 shows our findings. Overall, we see very little evidence that the increase in alcoholrelated harms documented above is countered by any decrease in drug-related harms. Neither do we see an increase in drug-related hospital admissions, as could be the case if drugs and alcohol were complements or if easing access to alcohol made illicit drug markets more accessible too. Our results suggest that any increase in the minimum legal purchase age in New Zealand need not be accompanied by an unintended surge in drug-related health problems.
The slight exception to this conclusion is for sixteen and seventeen year olds. When, and only when, we look at the proportion of all hospitalizations that have a drug-related diagnosis code, drugs seem to be becoming less of a problem for sixteen and seventeen year old males and more of a problem for sixteen and seventeen year old females. Alcohol-related hospitalizations seem also to decrease as a fraction of all hospitalizations among these young males, so this finding is not consistent with the substitution hypothesis either.
Mortality Consequences
In Table 6 we report difference in differences effects of the Sale of Liquor Act on mortality. 6 Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) argue that increases in alcohol consumption occur immediately after the date of legal eligibility in the United States and this increase in consumption is matched by an increase in mortality. We do not replicate their reduced-form finding in New Zealand. While the Poisson regression suggests a positive effect, it is far from statistically significant, and the proportion of deaths with alcohol-involved does not show a significant effect either. In these results, the most important finding is the large standard errors. Not many young New Zealanders are dying,
and not many die with alcohol-related problems, so it is hard to detect an effect.
Regression Discontinuity
In our dataset we know the exact age, in days, of a person admitted to hospital, and the exact date on which they were admitted. Given the fact that the liquor laws in New Zealand have restricted access to alcohol for people below a specific cutoff age and that this cutoff age changed during the period for which we have data, we can use two distinct regression discontinuity approaches to evaluating the effect of legal restrictions on alcohol access.
We do not have a first-stage regression in mind (for example, instrumenting endogenous alcohol consumption, as in Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) ). Instead, we are only estimating a reducedform relationship between legal eligibility to purchase alcohol and hospitalizations, just as in our difference in differences estimates. On one dimension -a person's age -we can examine whether there is a discontinuous change in the incidence of alcohol-related morbidity when the age of a person crosses over from being lower than the minimum legal purchase age to being above. On the other dimension -the date of hospital admission -we can examine whether 18 and 19 year olds become more likely to go into hospital with an alcohol-related diagnosis after the Sale of Liquor 6 We do not report specifications with a log dependent variable since some cells have zero deaths.
Act came into force on 1 December, 1999.
Our findings are represented graphically in figures 10 to 15 and in table 6. The figures show morbidity incidents for bins of size one month for the year before legal eligibility (or before the law change) and the year after legal eligibility (or after the law change). The lines superimposed on the graphs are fitted values from a regression using day-level data that includes a different cubic function of the running variable (age or date) on either side of the threshold. The unit of observation in our regressions is an age in days for a particular year and sex (e.g, males, 18 years and 201 days, in 1997). As such, we do not have a range of covariates to add to the regression. Table 6 shows results for a version of equation 2 and for a Poisson regression applied to the same data. (At the day level of observational units there are many zeros, so we do not estimate log specifications.) The equations we estimate generally include higher order polynomial terms in the age and date variables. Our findings using regression discontinuity methods are generally not statistically significant. As a quantitative matter, our estimates tend to be larger using the date-based discontinuity (the Law Change columns in table 6). That is, there is a bigger change in alcohol-related morbidity for 18 and 19 year olds who become newly eligible to purchase liquor as a result of the law change in 1999 when compared with the difference in morbidity for those just older and just younger than the cutoff age. The jump in morbidity after crossing the minimum legal age is somewhat larger after 1999 than before.
One interpretation of this finding is that prior to the law change enforcement of the minimum legal purchase age was sufficiently lax at the margin that it made no difference whether a person was 19 years and 11 months old or twenty years old. For those further from the minimum legal age restrictions were more likely to be enforced, so that when the Sale of Liquor Act was implemented there was an increase in morbidity among 18 and 19 year olds, especially the younger of these.
Alternatively, since many under the legal purchase age may acquire liquor through older acquain-tances, there is a minor effect of attaining the minimum legal purchase age. However when the purchase age was reduced, there was a substantial increase in the availability of alcohol for those well below the prior limit. Chay et al. (2005) compare the regression discontinuity method with difference-in-differences, finding that the latter provides inaccurate estimates in their setting. It remains as an exercise for future work to fully reconcile the regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference estimates in our context. Imperfect enforcement close to the age threshold is a possible explanation for why the difference-in-differences estimates are statistically significant but the regression discontinuity estimates are not.
Age vs Experience
The change of the minimum legal purchase age allows a crude test of whether young people encounter health problems when drinking because they are young or because they are inexperienced drinkers. The policy implications of the distinction are important. If inexperience is a problem, then raising the minimum age will just shift the age at which alcohol causes health problems. If, instead, it is being young that causes problems, then raising the minimum age will not cause larger problems later on. (Dee and Evans (2001) present some evidence on this matter for the United States.)
Some graphical evidence on this question is in Figure 3 . There is a dramatic increase in alcoholrelated morbidity as teenagers approach the MLPA. After becoming legally eligible, there appears to be a slight decline in morbidity. This decline is consistent with learning, or benefits of experience.
Interestingly a similar decline is not evident for drug-related incidents.
It is an open question what makes drugs and alcohol different in this regard, though we speculate that differences in the ease of overdosing on drugs and the general illegal status of many narcotics may be important factors.
We try to add econometric evidence to the graphical evidence. We estimate the effect of age for 22 year olds after the law change. Some in this group have been legally eligible to purchase liquor for two years, while others have been eligible for four years, while others are in between.
We construct day-level bins with counts of alcohol-related incidents then regress these incidents on the experience (days legally eligible to purchase liquor) as well as a time trend. For males the estimated coefficient on experience suggests that experience reduces alcohol-related morbidity, while for females experience increases alcohol-related morbidity. In each case the standard errors are large, so that the null of no effect from experience cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels (e.g. 5%). The imprecision of these estimates is no doubt related to the small population of New Zealand, but a different approach to the same question might yield a more precise conclusion.
(Results not reported.)
Interpretation
Rational Addiction
We now introduce a version of the canonical rational addiction model (Becker and Murphy, 1988) to interpret some of our results. In particular, we consider the various regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference estimates in light of the model. The model is of a forward-looking agent choosing between consumption of a generic good c and an addictive good a (think of it as alcohol).
Utility is quasi-linear in c and quadratic in a and a stock of experience with the addictive good s.
Period utility is given by
The agent maximizes ∞ s=t β s−t u s subject to y = c t + p t a t and s t+1 = (1 − d)(s t + a t ), s 16 = 0.
We assume that α a > 0, α aa < 0, and α as > 0 so that there is diminishing marginal utility in consumption of alcohol. Since α as > 0 greater past consumption raises the current marginal utility of consuming alcohol. In addition, the stock of alcohol consumption experience has independent effects on current utility. We assume that α s < 0 and α ss < 0 so that past consumption lowers current utility (at very short horizons this would be like a hangover), and the marginal effect of past consumption on current utility is increasingly large as past experience rises. We set an initial condition in which the individual has zero consumption experience at age sixteen.
The solution of the model is relatively straightforward given the quadratic preferences and linear constraints. The stock of experience is a time series process that features both backward-looking and forward-looking elements. It is backward-looking because the marginal utility of consumption today (and therefore the future stock of experience) is affected by past consumption. It is forward-looking because the individual knows that current actions will affect future choices. Becker et al. (1994) focus on the fact that behavior is forward looking in the rational addiction model, though Gruber and Koszegi (2001) argue that forward-looking behavior does not distinguish rational addiction from alternative hypotheses.
We simulate the model with a perfectly foreseen decrease in the price of alcohol. We think of this price reduction as reflecting the removal of potential punishment for illegal procurement. Figure 16 shows the time path of the variable a in the model. We simulate the model with periods of one quarter (three months) and consider the initial period to be at the age of 16 years, though much problem drinking begins at earlier ages. The figure shows the choices of such a person given a legal purchase age of 20 and separately the choices of a person given a legal purchase age of 18.
The figure shows some interesting choices that emerge from the rational addiction model. As expected, consumption tends to be higher for those eligible to consume legally. However as an individual approaches the MLPA consumption first drops then jumps up before gradually falling to its steady state. Comparing the periods immediately before and immediately after becoming eligible we see a drop in consumption even though consumption is generally higher for those above the legal purchase age. These effects depend crucially on the extent to which current consumption affects future utility. Individuals want to consume more before they cross the legal purchase age because this adds to their stock of experience and hence to the marginal utility of consumption in a period when they face lower prices. Alternative versions of the model with fast depreciation of the stock of experience do not produce such pronounced overshooting. The figure reveals that consumption is higher among those above the minimum legal purchase age, but the extent of the increase is unrelated to the change in consumption around the threshold, which relates to the agebased discontinuity estimate and the estimates in Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) . For substantially higher habit depreciation rates, the discontinuity at the MLPA is closer to the long-run effect. Figure 17 shows the model analog to figures 6 and 7. In particular, it shows average consumption in three age groups (always ineligible, newly eligible, always eligible) leading up to and after the law change, which in this simulation we assume is unforeseen. (The change in New Zealand was not strictly unanticipated, since the law was debated in parliament and passed nearly six months before taking effect.) The always eligible (20 and 21 year olds) and always ineligle (16 and 17 year olds) groups show minor variations after the law change. These differences are due to the change in timing of consumption swings associated with approaching and crossing the minimum legal purchase age. The newly eligible (18 and 19 year olds) show a substantial increase in consumption immediately after the law change, but this dissipates somewhat as their consumption closes in on consumption of the older group. This suggests that a regression discontinuity approach using the date of the law change may overstate the effect of legal eligibility on consumption. As with the age-based discontinuity, the extent to which an RD approach goes wrong in the model is related to the degree of persistence in the experience stock.
Computing the Effect of a Lower Purchase Age in the Model
Using this model, we can compute various estimates of the effect of the minimum legal purchase age. Let T be the minimum legal purchase age. From two time series calculated, with either T = 20
or T = 18, we can display the differences in consumption at each point in time. This is the model's assessment of the steady-state effect of a drinking age of 18 versus a drinking age of 20. In addition,
we compute several other statistics.
First, how much does alcohol consumption change when a person crosses the legal threshold.
We compute a T − a T −1 . This quantity is comparable to the age-based discontinuities we discuss above. We perform this calculation for two separate values of T , intended to reflect a high minimum purchase age and a low minimum purchase age. In each case, the initial condition is s 16 = 0: the person has zero accumulated experience upon turning sixteen.
Second, we simulate a change in the drinking age. We consider a population with one individual at each age, each of whom has been behaving as if they face T = T high = 20. Then, at year y = Y , we change the drinking age so that T = T low = 18. For those who are already 20, the change has no effect. For those who are younger than 20, and even younger than 18, the change matters for their behavior. We compute the following, which corresponds to our date-based discontinuties,
limiting the range of y to a narrow window around the date of the law change. It is the change in consumption for the age group that becomes eligible.
Third, given the simulated policy change, we can compute a difference-in-differences estimate.
We run a regression of alcohol consumption on age together with dummies for whether the observation is before or after the law change, whether the age group is the one that becomes eligible for legal consumption, and an interaction of the post and treatment dummies.
We perform these exercises on a particular calibration of the model. The qualitative results we discuss here are mostly insensitive to the model's parameters, with the exception of d, the rate of depreciation of the stock of experience, which we set to 0.3. With a depreciation rate of 0.3, the stock has a half-life of about six months, since each period in our model is intended to correspond to three months.
In this model, the steady-state consumption in adulthood depends only on the price of alcohol in adulthood, not on the minimum legal age or the punishment for underage participation. (This rules out the possibility that young people experiment more with alcohol and maybe get into bad habits they otherwise would not.) In the steady-state of each policy regime, consumption is higher among sixteen and seventeen year olds when the MLPA is eighteen instead of 20, and is substantially higher (50% to 100%) among eighteen and nineteen year olds. Consumption is similar for those over twenty. In the model, the law change leads to substantially higher youth consumption. For comparison with other approaches, the law generates higher consumption of about nine model units of alcohol among eighteen and nineteen year olds.
In our model, the age-based discontinuity in consumption is negative, the date-based discontinuity (considering 18 and 19 year olds just before and just after the law change) is large and positive, while the difference-in-differences estimate is in between the two RD effects. The true effect is relatively close to the difference-in-differences effect. The finding that age-based regression discontinuity estimates are smaller than date-based regression discontinuity estimates is also consistent with our findings in Table 6 . Furthermore, in another parallel between our empirical findings and the toy model, if we consider the Poisson regressions, the difference in differences estimates are between the age-based estimates and the date-based regression discontinuity estimates (compare Tables 6 and 6 ).
These observations, together with our estimates, caution against using the first-stage of Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) to infer the effect of a reduction in the minimum legal purchase age.
That first-stage regression is equivalent to our age-based estimates presented here. The rational addiction model we have simulated suggests that the estimates in Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) are far smaller than the likely consequences of lowering the minimum legal purchase age in the United States.
Caveats
The model is a model of consumption, not of risky behavior and associated morbidity. Our implementation of the model assumes a discrete change in enforcement, though in practice enforcement is likely to be less strict for those close to the minimum legal purchase age.
Should we think of the model as a way to interpret the data or of the data as a way to calibrate the model? Using the model to frame interpretations of the data suggests that the RD estimates are unreliable guides regarding the real effect of the law change. However we do not see the overshooting behavior in the data that the model produces for what we consider plausible depreciation rates.
Using data to inform the model suggests that habit effects are likely to be minor -the depreciation rate in the model should be small for overshooting effects to be absent.
Conclusion
In 1999, New Zealand's government passed the Sale of Liquor Act, lowering the minimum legal purchase age from 20 years to 18 years. In light of concerns that the lower purchase age has caused serious alcohol abuse problems, the current parliament is considering a reversal of the earlier reduction in the minimum legal age.
Using difference-in-differences methods, we estimate a statistically and economically significant increase in alcohol-related hospitalizations among young people as a consequence of the Sale of Liquor Act. One contribution of our paper is to separately estimate effects on males and females.
Our point estimates suggest 18 and 19 year old males saw a 26% increase in hospitalizations (standard error 7%) and females in the same age group had a 16% increase (standard error 10%).
While meaningful, these increases are much smaller than prior studies have found, possibly because of selection biases. (Our research draws on the universe of public hospitalizations in New Zealand over a twenty year period.) We find that those under 18 did not experience a significant increase in alcohol-related hospitalizations, again in contrast to some prior work.
Our research does not find a reduction in drug-related morbidity as a consequence of easier access to alcohol as would be expected if substitution is important. We do not find a clear increase in alcohol-related mortality due to the law change either. There is some evidence that experience with alcohol reduces the prevalence of health hazards, though this conclusion remains tentative.
We explore regression discontinuity methods to estimate the effects of the law change. There are two distinct discontinuities we can exploit: first, base on whether a person is older or younger than the MPA, and second, based on whether an age group is eligible or ineligible to legally purchase based on whether the Sale of Liquor Act has been passed or not. In each case our estimates are quite imprecise. Our findings are consistent with either weak enforcement of the minimum purchase age law at the cutoff age or with those younger than the minimum age being supplied by older peers.
As a policy matter, our findings suggest that raising the minimum legal purchase age would likely reduce the incidence of alcohol-related health problems, perhaps by around 20%, and this gain would not likely be offset by a rise in drug-related problems. However, 20% is not 100%: the minimum purchase age does not prevent all problems, and the data we present documents an ongoing upward trend, across age groups and for both men and women, in the extent of hospitalizations associated with alcohol that is not related to the Sale of Liquor Act. Understanding why this has been occurring and finding policy remedies should be an important part of the debate over liquor laws in New Zealand. 
